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The Transatlantic Agbiotech Conflict as a Problem  
and Opportunity for EU Regulatory Policies  
 
Les Levidow 
1. Introduction: explaining the transatlantic conflict 
The US and EU have developed quite different frameworks for agbiotech regulation, but these were 
potentially compatible with transatlantic trade in GM products.  How, then, did a trade conflict arise?  
And why is it a problem? 
 
Since the early 1990s the US government policy has treated agbiotech as technological progress 
yielding beneficial products which warrant no special label, and whose safety can be readily 
demonstrated through ‘sound science’.  Federal agencies readily approved or deregulated GM crops 
for cultivation and other uses.  Food regulators routinely accepted company claims that GM foods 
had substantial equivalence with a safe counterpart, as grounds not to require safety approval. 
 
By contrast the EU system has based its regulatory system on uncertainty about risks.  By enacting 
the 1990 Deliberate Release Directive, the EU required a risk assessment and safety approval for all 
GM products.  From 1996-97 the EU began to approve some GM products already commercialised in 
the US.  And the EU eventually required statutory labelling, which became successively more 
stringent.   
 
After public protest mounted in the late 1990s, the EU regulatory procedure underwent delays and 
blockages.  In 1999 the EU Council suspended the decision-making procedure for new GM products, 
and some member states banned GM products which had already gained EU-wide approval.  A trade 
conflict with the USA led to anticipation and threats of a WTO case, which was launched in 2003.   
 
Trans-Atlantic regulatory divergence has been widely seen as the main source of the US-EU trade 
conflict.   Moreover, each jurisdiction has been stereotyped in ways which diagnose why the 
divergence is a problem.  According to some commentators, for example, the US bases its regulation 
on ‘sound science’, while EU restrictions and delays have accommodated the fears of an irrational 
public. According to other commentators, the US government bases safety claims on scientific 
ignorance and force-feeds the world with GM food, while the EU defends precaution and democratic 
sovereignty. Although these arguments differ greatly in standpoint, they all emphasise transatlantic 
differences and consequent problems.   
 
This chapter challenges such explanations centering on transatlantic regulatory divergence.  Instead it 
will ask: How did the trade conflict arise from policy agendas which span the Atlantic?  How has it 
been framed as a problem and used as an opportunity for policy agendas within the EU?  (For 
analogous roles within US policy debate, see Murphy and Levidow, 2006).   
 
The rest of this Introduction summarises the overall argument, as follows:  The US-EU conflict arose 
from contending transatlantic agendas, which have operated within and across the two jurisdictions.  
Corresponding to each agenda, trans-Atlantic coalitions framed the policy problem in three different 
ways: first, regulatory harmonisation for trade liberalisation of a benign technology and its safe 
products; second, the consumer right to know and choose safe food, based on precautionary risk 
assessment; and third, civil society participation in broad evaluation criteria for agbiotech products, 
which need prior proof of their safety.   
 
The trade-liberalisation agenda set the context in which European protest could frame agbiotech as a 
dual threat of ‘globalisation’ and unknown risks.  Greater controversy led to regulatory blockages 
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and a trade conflict, which policy actors diagnosed in ways convenient for their own agendas.  
Promoting agbiotech, some politicians warned that EU regulatory delays or more stringent rules 
would be found illegal at the WTO.  But this strategy backfired; instead it provided a vulnerable 
target for attack by ‘anti-globalisation’ activists.  Citing US threats of a WTO case, opponents sought 
to delegitimise pro-agbiotech policies as a surrender to political and commercial pressures.     
 
From the late 1990s onwards, some European policymakers articulated a new problem − how ‘to 
restore public and market confidence’ − as an imperative for institutional reform.  This problem-
diagnosis helped to bypass earlier disagreements about the ‘scientific’ basis of regulatory criteria, 
thus facilitating more precautionary approaches to risk assessment and GM labelling.  These changes 
accommodated key aspects of the ‘consumer rights’ agenda, thus potentially establishing a stronger 
basis to legitimise EU decisions.   
 
As the conclusion will explain, the overall analysis extends insights from other academic accounts 
(Bernauer, 2003; Jasanoff, 2005; Toke, 2004; Isaac, 2002).  This chapter also disagrees with some 
accounts, especially those which attribute the US-EU conflict to distinct jurisdictional characteristics.  
That analysis draws upon the results of three research projects [note 1].   
 
As its structure, this chapter first sketches how contending transatlantic agendas generated the 
conflict.  Then it shows how an EU regulatory impasse stimulated policy change in regulatory criteria 
and expert advisory arrangements.  Finally the conclusion summarizes how contending transatlantic 
agendas operate within EU agbiotech regulation and drive its ongoing tensions. 
2.  Contending trans-Atlantic policy agendas 
A trade-liberalisation agenda set the context in which European protest could frame agbiotech as a 
dual threat of ‘globalisation’ and unknown risks.  Conflicts arose in the mid-1990s, especially around 
proposals to approve GM crops for cultivation, potentially leading to a US-EU trade trade conflict.  
This section describes how various policy actors used the conflict to elaborate and promote their 
contending agendas.   
 
Using the transatlantic conflict: Bt maize crisis 
 
As the EU statutory framework for agbiotech, the 1990 EC Deliberate Release Directive 
encompassed diverse agendas.  It aimed to harmonise regulatory criteria for GM products, as a means 
‘to complete the internal market’.  From this perspective, the policy problem was divergent national 
criteria which could impede internal trade. The solution lay in an EU-wide regulatory framework 
basing the internal market on a high level of protection for human health and the environment (EEC, 
1990).  By the mid-1990s those aims were linked with another policy framework: to promote 
agbiotech for European economic competitiveness (Levidow et al., 1996).  These various agendas 
soon collided in decisions about specific GM products. 
 
In late 1996 the EU Council members could not agree on whether to approve Ciba-Geigy’s Bt-176 
maize, present in grain shipments imminently arriving from the USA.  The European Commission 
had the authority to make the decision itself, but its members could not agree, according to leaked 
minutes.  The Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan argued that indecision in Brussels might anger the 
US government. Other Commissioners successfully advocated waiting for the opinions of three EU-
level scientific committees, given the wider expert disagreements over safety.  There were also 
disagreements about whether commercial approval should include a labelling requirement. Along 
with Leon Brittan, the Industry Commissioner Martin Bangemann opposed mandatory labelling; they 
argued that such a requirement might be illegal under international trade rules and could draw the EU 
into a trade dispute at the WTO (Rich, 1997: 8).  
 
Meanwhile the mass media highlighted expert disagreements over product safety. Some experts were 
concerned that the antibiotic-resistance gene in the Bt-176 maize might enter pathogenic microbes 
and jeopardise the clinical use of the corresponding antibiotic.  The Bureau Européen des Unions de 
Consommateurs (BEUC) emphasised several risks that had already been raised by some member 
states as a basis to oppose approval. But eventually the EU’s expert bodies rejected all safety 
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concerns about the product. On those grounds, the European Commission approved Ciba-Geigy’s Bt-
176 maize in January 1997, despite opposition from nearly all EU member states.. 
 
The decision was widely attacked as illegitimate, especially by analogy to the 1996 BSE crisis.  
When the European Commission’s minutes were leaked in the Belgian newspaper Le Soir, it used the 
headline ‘After mad cow, recidivism with transgenic maize’ (Rich, 1997: 1).  According to a Green 
Member of the European Parliament, ‘Despite mad cow, they have learned nothing!’ The Pesticides 
Action Network argued, ‘This is crazy. They have started a gigantic experiment with us as the guinea 
pigs’ (ibid: 8). In April 1997 the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to denounce the 
European Commission for its approval decision. 
 
According to the Commission minutes, US maize shipments had been creating a strong pressure on 
the European Union to approve Bt-176 maize as quickly as possible. Some Commissioners were 
anticipating a compensation claim from the US if they failed to authorise the product. However, the 
Consumer Affairs Commissioner, Emma Bonino, expressed regret that the approval decision was 
responding to economic pressures. She believed that the European Commission should reflect on 
consumer concerns and their desire for transparency. Mentioning the BSE crisis, Commissioner Neil 
Kinnock said that consumer confidence must be re-established; maize is widely used and GM maize 
would be difficult to identify in derived products (ibid.). 
 
In all those ways, an incipient trade conflict was being used for contending policy agendas within the 
EU.  Arguments to minimise regulatory delays and criteria came from Commissioner Brittan, who 
was already championing trade liberalisation, and from Bangemann, who was promoting agbiotech 
as an imperative for the EU’s economic competitiveness.  Now they framed the trade conflict as EU 
delinquency which would result in a guilty verdict at the WTO.  By contrast, other Commissioners 
echoed public concerns about scientific uncertainty and consumer choice.  Some politicians sought to 
bypass the conflict through official expert advice, yet this too became part of the risk controversy.  
Meanwhile environmental NGOs sought to delegitimise any product approval, thus increasing the 
pressure upon governments to delay or reject such a decision.  These policy agendas roughly 
correspond to formal coalitions, as described next.   
 
Contending trans-Atlantic policy agendas  
 
Pressures for rapid EU approval came from a trade liberalisation agenda.  In 1995 the Commission’s 
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) identified ‘barriers to transatlantic trade’ as the main problem for 
EU and US policy makers.  Representing multinational companies, the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD) helped to define the NTA’s aims and the overall policy agenda. Regulatory 
harmonisation was expressed with the slogan, ‘Approved Once, Accepted Everywhere’, at least at the 
transatlantic level, ideally leading to a New Transatlantic Marketplace. In 1998 the US and EU 
governments established the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), a quasi-technical 
government-business network, to help implement TABD proposals.  The DG-Trade Commissioner 
Leon Brittan led the EU-wide promotion of the trade liberalisation policy (Murphy and Levidow, 
2006). 
 
For the agricultural biotechnology sector, TABD members identified pre-market safety assessment as 
the only regulatory issue. TABD emphasised the need for a common approach across the Atlantic, 
and ideally a centralised approval procedure, based on ‘sound science’.  Designed as a largely 
technical body, the TEP aimed to identify regulatory differences as a step towards overcoming them.  
 
According to Grant Isaac (2002), the NTA-TEP and TABD have both sought multilateral integration, 
towards ‘allowing decentralised markets to achieve efficient and optimal objectives’, though with 
different strategies.  In his view, the TABD seeks to identify and coordinate any divergent 
regulations which may impede trade, and thus to develop a common regulatory framework.  By 
contrast, the TEP seeks to internalise traditionally non-market, social objectives into such a 
framework (ibid: 27).  Regardless of any such differences in emphasis, they shared a common 
agenda: how to harmonise risk assessment for trade liberalisation. 
 
Although EU regulation of agbiotech diverged from the US model, the EC Deliberate Release 
Directive was foreseen as a means towards trade liberalisation.  From the start, EU agbiotech 
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regulation framed GM techniques as a novel process which warranted special risk-assessment 
procedures for all GM products.  European Commission staff advocated this regulatory framework as 
a basis for harmonising EU-wide regulatory criteria (Levidow et al., 1996), even for overcoming 
trans-Atlantic differences (Jasanoff, 2005: 82).   
  
In the mid-1990s civil society protests began to challenge the neoliberal ‘free trade’ agenda, through 
movements widely called ‘anti-capitalist’ or ‘anti-globalisation’. Such protests created the context in 
which mainstream NGOs could more effectively challenge the NTA-TEP.  Among other critics, 
consumer groups attacked the NTA-TEP for favouring industry influence and for ‘levelling down’ 
standards.  Anti-agbiotech activists linked several threats: trade liberalisation policies, economic 
globalisation, corporate power and unknown risks of GM products. 
 
Facing legitimacy problems, in 1998 the US and EU invited NGOs to establish their own 
‘transatlantic dialogues’, as a basis to participate in the NTA-TEP process. Each network devised a 
different strategic response to that general process and to agbiotech in particular.  Through the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), consumer NGOs found shared goals in ‘consumer rights’, 
such as the ‘right to safe products’, the ‘right to know and right to choose’, and jurisdictional 
sovereignty to accommodate diverse standards from consumer demands.  They demanded 
precautionary regulation and full labelling of GM food products. Relative to TACD members, 
environmental groups were more antagonistic towards transatlantic trade liberalisation and agbiotech.  
The Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) opposed agbiotech as long as there was no 
convincing evidence about its ‘harmlessness to man and nature’.  They proposed civil society 
participation in broad evaluation criteria for agbiotech products. They also opposed the concentration 
of corporate control over the food system (Murphy and Levidow, 2006).   
 
Thus agbiotech was framed in three different ways, corresponding to the three transatlantic 
Dialogues. Proponents linked the technology to efficient agriculture, economic growth, and benefits 
to farmers and the environment.  Mainstream consumer groups did not oppose biotechnology in 
principle but demanded stronger regulatory frameworks from a consumer rights perspective.  
Especially in Europe, environmental groups framed the technology as an ominous symbol of 
corporate domination, economic globalisation and unsustainable agriculture.   
 
From NGOs and some governments, critical voices gained a greater hearing in the EU policy system 
as intense public controversy erupted over agbiotech in the late 1990s.  Protests coincided with a 
wider crisis of the agri-food safety system.  The ‘mad cow’ epidemic was framed as a threat of 
intensive agriculture generating health hazards which elude the available scientific knowledge and 
official expert advice.  According to some critics, intensive agriculture threatened alternative values 
and futures of European agriculture (Levidow and Marris, 2001).  GM products were likewise turned 
into a symbol of such threats; EU democratic sovereignty was counterposed to ‘globalisation’ and the 
TABD-TEP agenda.  Thus the US-EU agbiotech conflict arose from contending policy agendas 
operating across Atlantic.   
3  Regulatory impasse as stimulus 
In the late 1990s EU-wide regulatory conflicts challenged the narrow criteria which had facilitated 
product approvals.  Beyond the Bt maize mentioned above, in 1997-98 the Commission granted EU-
wide approval to some GM crops as normal commercial products, i.e. with no requirement for special 
control measures.  Such decisions provoked dissent from member states and became targets for anti-
agbiotech critics, e.g. on grounds that relevant uncertainties were ignored (Levidow et al., 2000). 
 
Citing the familiar ‘pesticide treadmill’ as an analogy, agbiotech critics warned that GM crops would 
create a ‘genetic treadmill’, whereby weed or insect pests develop resistance to newly inserted genes.  
This resistance could pose a problem not only for pest control but also for additional pesticide sprays 
to control resistant pests.  This scenario became a salient issue for GM herbicide-tolerant oilseed 
rape, which France prohibited in 1997.  The debate there was used to generate resources for risk 
research; French scientists tested how far herbicide-tolerance genes flowed and persisted over several 
generations.  The empirical results were cited to justify the original rationale for the French ban. 
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Potential harm to farmland biodiversity became a salient issue in the UK.  Controversy focused on 
whether broad-spectrum herbicide sprays on GM herbicide-tolerant crops would cause relatively 
more or less harm to farmland biodiversity than their conventional counterparts.  The government 
funded Farm-Scale Evaluations to obtain empirical evidence, whereby credible test methods 
depended upon involvement of a broader agro-environmental expertise, including nature 
conservation agencies.  More generally, the UK government sought stronger empirical evidence to 
support official expert claims.  Sceptical voices were encouraged to contribute to the UK policy 
debate, towards building a stronger consensus for agricultural biotechnology. In practice ‘this effort 
to broaden politics led to a more extensive unpacking of scientific unknowns’, argues Jasanoff (2005: 
277).   
 
By the late 1990s public protest was deterring approvals and a market for GM products.  European 
supermarket chains decided to find alternative sources of grain, as a means to exclude GM 
ingredients from their own-brand products (Levidow and Bijman, 2002).  Governments had greater 
difficulty to justify why they were continuing to support the commercial use of GM crops and foods. 
Some member states banned GM products that had already gained EU-level approval.  Amid a 
legitimacy crisis and trade conflict, civil society organisations found greater opportunities to block 
agbiotech and/or to demand more stringent regulatory criteria.  In such ways, they used the trade 
conflict to intensify domestic political conflict (cf. Bernauer, 2003). 
 
In June 1999 some Ministers in the EU’s Environment Council agreed to block the regulatory 
procedure for GM products. Many of them signed one of two similar statements that they would not 
consider additional GM products for approval until the EU had made significant changes to its 
regulatory framework in order to address various weaknesses. To justify this delay, they cited ‘the 
need to restore public and market confidence’, while leaving ambiguous the object of lost confidence, 
e.g. GM products, EU regulatory procedures, etc.  
 
Together those statements became known as an unofficial de facto moratorium on any further 
approvals of GM products. In their June 1999 statements, EU Environment Council members 
specified the regulatory changes necessary before the approvals procedure could resume. The list 
included: basing risk assessment upon precaution, and requiring traceability and labelling of all GM 
products and derived products.  The European Commission still had the legal authority to approve 
products if the European Council failed to do so, but the Commission had a weaker will and political 
authority after the 1997 crisis over Ciba-Geigy’s Bt maize. 
 
Stimulated by the de facto moratorium in 1999, the Commission initiated legislative changes to 
accommodate demands from member states.  Until then, draft revisions of the Directive had aimed to 
streamline the approval procedure, potentially reducing regulatory burdens.  After 1999 the redrafts 
incorporated more precautionary and stringent criteria (Levidow and Carr, 2000). For example, no 
risk should be ignored on grounds that it would be unlikely, and uncertainties should be explained for 
any identified risk (EC, 2001).  Such rules formalised pressures to open up expert judgements about 
scientific uncertainty.   
 
A common rationale for the de facto moratorium, the aim to ‘restore public and market confidence’, 
provided a means to go beyond previous disagreements about the ‘scientific’ basis for regulatory 
requirements.  Institutional reforms provided a more flexible basis for regulatory-expert procedures 
to accommodate many concerns of mainstream consumer NGOs and environmental conservation 
groups − though not demands to prove ‘harmlessness’, which would have the effect of simply 
blocking GM products.  These changes accommodated demands from many civil society 
organisations, while potentially creating a more legitimate basis to approve some GM products in the 
future.   
4  Precautionary shifts in agbiotech regulation 
Since the late 1990s conflicts continued over exactly how to revise and implement EU regulations.  
Meanwhile the US intensified its threats to bring a WTO case against the EU regarding agbiotech 
products. The Commission privately warned US officials that their overt threats were undermining its 
own efforts to establish a workable regulatory system.  
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Indeed, agbiotech critics used the transatlantic conflict to press for more stringent EU rules.  The 
Commission generally favoured less-restrictive criteria than some member states did, especially on 
grounds that EU rules must be workable and comply with international commitments.  Yet critics 
denounced its specific proposals as a surrender to US pressures, while advocating more stringent 
rules as necessary for EU sovereignty. When the European Parliament supported such rules on GM 
labelling, a Green MEP declared, ‘It’s a great victory for consumer choice and a clear message to 
Tony Blair and his American friends’ (Agence Europe, 2002).  After the US decision to launch a 
WTO case against the EU in May 2003, agbiotech critics likewise framed any EU approval of a GM 
product as a surrender.   
 
In response the Commission has sought to counter public suspicions about external pressures.  
Eventually it promoted the new EU procedures as a better global model, whose credibility would 
depend upon timely implemention.  In particular, member states should restart the procedure for 
approving GM products: ‘We have to start because we want to demonstrate to the rest of the world 
that our way of taking decisions about GMOs works.  Otherwise they will not believe us’, according 
to the DG-Environment Commissioner (Margot Wallström, Associated Press, 28.01.04).  After much 
effort along those lines, the Commission finally approved the first new GM product in spring 2004, 
the implementation date for new EU rules on traceability and labelling.  Not coincidentally, this 
decision came just before a crucial meeting of parties to the WTO dispute. 
 
Commission policy statements awkwardly combine diverse aims.  For example: ‘science-based 
regulatory oversight’ aims ‘to enable Community business to exploit the potential of biotechnology 
while taking account of the precautionary principle and addressing ethical and social concerns’ 
(CEC, 2003: 6, 17).  Shifts in practical meaning are summarised in Table 1: regulatory criteria in the 
left-hand side are sketched in this section, and expert advisory roles on the right-hand side are 
sketched in the subsequent section.   
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
Crop cultivation: agro-environmental risks   
 
When GM crops were being evaluated for cultivation uses in the mid-1990s under the Deliberate 
Release Directive, sharp disagreements arose even before public debate became widespread.  
Proponents narrowly defined the ‘adverse effects’ to be evaluated, thus accepting the normal hazards 
of intensive monoculture.  Environmental NGOs had warned that such products would result in a 
‘genetic treadmill’, by analogy to the familiar ‘pesticide treadmill’.  Safety claims accepted such 
effects, e.g. the prospect of spreading herbicide-resistant weeds or insecticide-resistant insects; thus 
regulatory procedures accepted the inherent hazards of intensive monoculture.   
 
This approach conceptually homogenised the European environment as a resource for efficient agri-
production, as in the US model of intensive monoculture.  Product approval decisions minimised 
responsibility for any undesirable effects.  This approach facilitated EU-wide regulatory 
harmonisation, trans-Atlantic trade in GM products and thus the TABD-TEP agenda. 
 
When the Directive was revised along more stringent lines, the revision broadened the range of agro-
environmental effects which are to be prevented or managed; these included the effects of any 
changes in management practices, e.g. herbicide sprays.   Market-stage monitoring could be required 
to verify any assumptions in the risk assessment (EC, 2001). Overall these changes broadened the 
scope of ‘scientific’ issues and of the European ‘environment’, thus complicating the earlier basis for 
regulatory harmonisation. 
 
Another crisis provided an opportunity for different policy agendas.  In the 2000 Starlink scandal, a 
GM maize had been legally cultivated by US farmers before government approval for food & feed 
purposes; such approval was ultimately denied because of doubts about health risks.  Starlink maize 
was then found to be illegally present in the food chain, especially in North America but also in 
Europe.  Anti-agbiotech groups cited this scandal to demand a ban on all GM products.   
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Yet the Commission used the scandal for a different agenda.  Under the slogan, ‘one door, one key’, 
the Commission had been attempting to integrate approval for all product uses within ‘vertical’ 
product-based legislation since the mid-1990s.  This proposal now gained support as a means to 
avoid another Starlink scandal, by ensuring that no GM crop cultivation would be authorised before 
approval for food and feed purposes.   
 
In using this opportunity for legislative change, the Commission centralised the regulatory procedure. 
Under a new GM Food & Feed Regulation, advice from the European Food Safety Authority (see 
later section) would inform decisions by the Commission, coordinated and prepared by DG-
Agriculture.  Thus decisions to approve a GM crop for cultivation were removed from the Deliberate 
Release Directive, thus potentially bypassing the national authorities responsible for environmental 
protection. This change was widely criticised for marginalising environmental issues but prevailed in 
the final version (EC, 2003a).  Parliament supported centralisation as a means to avoid the 
disagreements which had delayed regulatory decisions since the late 1990s. 
 
GM food risks  
 
When the EU was approving the first GM crops for cultivation, their food uses came under a new 
regime which facilitated approval decisions.  The 1997 Novel Food Regulation had a simplified 
procedure for approving novel products including GM foods. A national authority need not carry out 
a risk assessment for any GM which had ‘substantial equivalence’ with a non-GM counterpart 
regarded as safe (EC, 1997a).  In practice this procedure assumed that physico-chemical composition 
tests alone could demonstrate such equivalence.  Under a similar policy, the US FDA did not 
generally require a risk assessment or even approval of GM foods.  Complementing the TABD-TEP 
agenda, the EU simplified procedure facilitated regulatory harmonisation, thus helping to avoid trade 
barriers within the EU and across the Atlantic. 
 
However, the concept of substantial equivalence underwent widespread criticism, especially as an 
‘unscientific’ means to bypass risk assessment and safety tests.  Some national expert advisory 
bodies were already interpreting the concept according to more stringent criteria; for example, they 
requested more rigorous evidence of physico-chemical composition, as well as more toxicological 
tests.  Scientists’ efforts along those lines converged with demands of consumer organisations 
criticising substantial equivalence (Levidow et al., 2007).   
 
Eventually substantial equivalence lost its statutory role.  When Italy banned GM foods which had 
been approved by the US and EU, other member states joined its attack on the simplified procedure.  
Recognising its legitimacy problem, the Commission abandoned the simplified procedure when 
drafting the GM Food & Feed Regulation in 2001.  Substantial equivalence would be kept as a risk-
assessment tool, but EU-wide harmonisation might be difficult to achieve for this ‘dynamic concept’, 
whose interpretation was still under development, according to a Commission official (Pettauer, 
2002: 23).  The concept of substantial equivalence continued to inform expert judgements in more 
stringent ways, as regards what evidence would be adequate for a risk assessment.   
 
GM labelling and traceability   
 
GM labelling rules have been introduced and extended to manage market instabilities.  EU policy 
initially rejected demands that GM food should have a mandatory label. According to Commission 
officials, such a rule would stigmatise GM products as abnormal, threaten the internal market, and 
undermine science-based regulation. In response to public protest and consumer concerns, in 1997 
the retail trade imposed its own labelling rules; these effectively defined what is/not a GM food, 
though the criteria varied across EU member states.  Combined with public unease, diverse labelling 
criteria could have jeopardised the overall market for soya or maize, as well as the EU internal 
market.  Recognising this problem, in 1997 new EU rules required labelling according to the 
detectability of DNA or protein at a 1% level.   
 
Further changes in labelling rules were linked with market functions.  As an extra condition for 
lifting the 1999 de facto moratorium, EU member states had demanded full labelling and traceability 
of GM ingredients, i.e. regardless of their detectability. In response, in 2001 the Commission issued 
draft legislation along those lines.  Some Commissioners had previously opposed such rules but now 
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supported them as essential ‘for the free market to function effectively’.  The new regime would 
allow a low threshold for ‘adventitious presence’ of GM material, i.e. levels which were technically 
unavoidable (EC, 2003a).  Each GM crop must be traceable throughout the agro-food chain, e.g. by 
using ‘unique identifiers’ for the specific transformation event which constructed a GM crop (EC, 
2003b).  Retailers became dependent upon a paper trail to verify sources of grain, especially in cases 
where it is highly processed and so makes the DNA undetectable.   
 
The new rules implicitly linked precaution with markets.  Authorities could now trace and withdraw 
a product if problems arise later.  Consumers would have a free, informed choice to avoid GM 
products and thus to make their own judgements on safety.  Not simply ‘completing the internal 
market’, EU rules were redefining product-identity, thus restructuring markets for GM ingredients as 
well as non-GM food.  In the original1990 regulatory framework, the public had been cast as an 
audience for safety claims, as consumers of food potentially containing GM ingredients, and thus as 
supporters of a beneficial technology − roles which publics eventually rejected.  New rules 
accommodated demands to extend consumer rights and to clarify the identity of any food which may 
contain GM ingredients.  Using the new opportunity, anti-agbiotech activists sought to block GM 
grain whose products would now require a GM label under the new rules. 
5.  Expert authority for regulatory decisions 
In parallel with the legislative changes sketched above, the EU also made changes in expert advisory 
arrangements (see Table 1, right-hand side).  This meant more accountable ways of translating risk 
controversy and scientific uncertainty into criteria for evidence.   These changes institutionalised 
aspects of the ‘consumer rights’ agenda, while incorporating consumer organisations into 
consultation procedures. 
 
Precaution and uncertainty   
 
In the late 1990s precaution was becoming more contentious as grounds to block products, especially 
in the agri-food sector. After the US brought its WTO case against the EU over hormone-treated 
beef, eventually the Appellate Body ruled that the defendant had failed to justify its beef ban through 
a risk assessment (WTO AB, 1998).  Amid EU conflicts over the Precautionary Principle in many 
sectors, the Commission sought to clarify the concept.   
 
According to its 2000 Communication, risk-management measures could be justified where uncertain 
risks jeopardise ‘the chosen level of protection’, i.e. the type or extent of risks deemed acceptable.  In 
such cases, a risk assessment must demonstrate reasonable grounds to suspect that a product could 
cause ‘potentially dangerous effects’.  Whenever taking precautionary measures, authorities must 
make efforts to obtain additional scientific information for ‘a more complete risk assessment’ (CEC, 
2000).  
 
The guidelines aimed to ensure that the Precautionary Principle would be used only in ways 
defensible under the EU’s treaty obligations. The Commission’s criteria were broader than in WTO 
rules and in some national policy frameworks, though more narrow than in some others.  In effect, 
Commission guidelines provide a basis for selectively limiting the Precautionary Principle, i.e. to be 
invoked only in cases where the Commission decides to justify trade barriers.  Such decisions would 
also depend upon expert bodies giving explicit advice about scientific uncertainty. 
 
Advisory expertise 
 
In the run-up to the BSE crisis, expert advice downplayed scientific uncertainties and made policy 
judgements about their manageability, yet safety claims were officially portrayed as ‘science’.  
Moreover, experts aimed to give advice that would be politically acceptable to regulators, while 
avoiding public alarm about any risks (Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2001).  The Commission 
likewise covered up the BSE problem, for fear that public concern about the BSE problem would 
endanger the European beef market, according to a report by the European Parliament (1997).  
Expert bodies were being used by politicians to avoid full responsibility for decisions.  Consequently, 
EU safety claims came under greater suspicion as policy stances, especially given that expert 
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advisory bodies were hosted by the same Directorate-General responsible for relevant legislation and 
product approvals. 
 
In response to various food crises including BSE, policymakers aimed to make EU scientific 
committees more independent in three respects: from DGs which propose and implement legislation, 
from member states, and from material interests.  In reorganising its scientific committees, the 
Commission aimed ‘to obtain timely and sound advice’, ‘based on the principles of excellence, 
independence and transparency’ (EC, 1997b).  Prospective members nominated themselves, rather 
than being chosen by member states.  Risk assessment was separated from risk management through 
new arrangements, later described as a ‘functional separation’.  Scientific committees were shifted to 
the directorate-general for Consumer Health, renamed DG-SANCO.   
 
Greater political dependence upon expert advice meant more conflicting advice and difficulties for 
regulatory harmonisation.  Some member states created independent agencies whose risk-assessment 
advice often questioned safety assumptions, even the expert advice from EU-level scientific 
committees.  In this way, ‘The legitimacy and the autonomy of the European Commission, and 
indeed its rapports de force with the EU member states, are thus being displaced to the arena of 
scientific expertise’ (Dratwa, 2004: 13). 
 
EU expert advice was further restructured, as a means for the Commission to enhance its political 
authority, while incorporating potential critics into new institutions.  Under a 2002 food law, the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was created as an independent body which would help set 
‘science-based’ standards for risk assessment.  It would have greater expert resources, needed to 
clarify or reconcile disagreements across different expert bodies (EC, 2002).  In establishing EFSA, 
its Management Board included representatives of industry and consumer NGOs as partners with 
shared understandings of policy problems, especially the need to gain public confidence (Smith et al., 
2004).   
  
EU expert advice on GM products 
 
In the EU regulatory procedure for evaluating GM products, there was much conflict over the criteria 
in the mid- to late 1990s.  According to the advice of EU scientific committees on each product, there 
was no evidence to indicate that the product would cause adverse effects. Such a wording left 
ambiguous the burden of evidence to demonstrate safety.  Safety claims often depended upon 
normative judgements, e.g. by classifying some undesirable effects as merely agronomic and 
therefore irrelevant, or by advising on the management of such effects, or by favourably comparing 
any harm from a GM crop to the harm from agrochemical usage.  All these judgements came under 
criticism from member states (Levidow et al., 2000).   
 
EFSA was established in 2003, when member states were again evaluating GM products under the 
revised Deliberate Release Directive.  In evaluating a series of GM products, e.g. food or grain 
imports for feed, EFSA’s Scientific Panel declared that each one would be as safe as its non-GM 
counterpart.  Some safety claims still depended on normative judgements about acceptable effects.   
 
Partly for those reasons, member states have often disagreed with EFSA’s safety claims.  Some have 
questioned whether the available information was adequate for a risk assessment, whether the 
environmental assessment adequately covered their specific conditions, and whether specific 
undesirable effects should be regarded as acceptable.  Such criticisms were often taken up by other 
member states.  These expert disagreements can be interpreted as different accounts of precaution, 
whereby safety claims correspond to more narrow accounts than objections; the latter define harm 
and uncertainty in broader ways (Levidow et al., 2005).  In response to demands from some national 
regulators and NGOs, eventually the guidance notes asked all applicants for a ‘risk characterisation’, 
which would make scientific uncertainties more explicit (EFSA GMO Panel, 2004).  In sum, expert 
advisory arrangements institutionalised aspects of the ‘consumer rights’ agenda, e.g. greater 
precaution and transparency, while incorporating consumer organisations into consultation 
procedures; these changes providing a stronger basis to legitimise safety claims and regulatory 
decisions. 
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6.  Conclusion: contending policy agendas 
Let us return to the questions posed in the Introduction: How did the US-EU conflict arise from 
contending agendas which span the Atlantic? How has the trade conflict been framed as a problem 
and used as an opportunity within the EU?  Through those questions, this Conclusion discusses other 
major academic accounts of policy conflict over agbiotech. 
 
As this essay has shown, the US-EU conflict arose from contending transatlantic agendas, which 
operated within and across the two jurisdictions.  The policy problem was framed in three different 
ways, corresponding to the three Transatlantic Dialogues: regulatory harmonisation for trade 
liberalisation of a benign technology (TABD-TEP); the consumer right to know and choose safe 
food, based on precautionary risk assessment, with sovereignty to accommodate such criteria 
(TACD); and opposition to products lacking proof of safety and imposing corporate control over the 
agri-food chain (TAED).  Thus a neoliberal policy agenda set the context in which European protest 
could frame agbiotech as a dual threat of ‘globalisation’ and unknown risks.   
 
Jurisdictional characteristics and/or interactions? 
 
Some academic analyses have attributed the US-EU conflict to separate jurisdictional characteristics. 
For example, US-EU differences in scientific risk assessment ‘are related to different cultural 
attitudes’ towards agbiotech, argues Toke (2004).  According to Grant Isaac, ‘endogenous political-
economy factors’ shape regulatory regimes in each jurisdiction, e.g. in the USA and EU (Isaac, 2002: 
251).  He emphasises their internal sources, ‘because the domestic regulatory approach sets the 
prospects of and limits to regulatory integration’ at the international level, e.g. through treaties (ibid: 
24-25).   
 
Of course these jurisdictional characteristics matter, but not as independent variables; at most they 
can explain internal conflicts and the relative strengths of contending transatlantic agendas within 
each jurisdiction.  As EU domestic controversy and regulatory blockages led to a transatlantic trade 
conflict, policy actors diagnosed this as a problem according to their own agendas.  The anti-
agbiotech environmentalist agenda gained much greater support in Europe (than in the USA), e.g. by 
linking GM food with public suspicion towards hazards of intensive agriculture and undemocratic 
‘globalisation’.  Amid a legitimacy crisis for government, civil society organisations found greater 
opportunities to block agbiotech and/or to demand more stringent regulatory criteria.  In such ways, 
they used the trade conflict to intensify domestic political conflict (cf. Bernauer, 2003).  The 
legitimacy problems and processes of European integration provided greater opportunity for those 
advocating more stringent rules or regulatory delays. 
 
From the late 1990s onwards, some policymakers and expert advisors articulated a new problem − 
how ‘to restore public and market confidence’ − as an imperative for institutional reform.  Eventually 
the EU enacted more precautionary legislation.  It also established EFSA as a means to enhance the 
public credibility of expert advice, partly by incorporating consumer organisations into new 
structures.  As regards market confidence, new labelling rules redefined ‘GM food’ in successively 
broader ways.  Taking advantage of these more comprehensive rules, agbiotech opponents sought to 
extend the commercial blockage of GM grain.   
 
The above story differs from some academic diagnoses of regulatory frameworks as a problem.  
According to David Toke (2004), national policies claim a scientific basis which in turn reinforces a 
given policy.  Distinctive regulatory discourses are translated by scientists or expert advisors into 
‘factual’ terms.  A government may need to accommodate public concerns which eventually arise, so 
it would be better to anticipate them in advance.  Yet an institutional path dependency often makes a 
policy framework insensitive or inflexible to such changes in context, he argues (ibid: 205-8).  In his 
diagnosis, ‘science-based regulation’ readily becomes a constraint on policymaking.  On the 
contrary, however, European expert advice flexibly changed its judgements along more stringent 
lines, thus stimulating and accommodating changes in regulatory policy, in response to public 
protest.   
 
Going beyond an EU-US comparative approach, Thomas Bernauer (2003) analyses how transatlantic 
interactions underlie US-EU regulatory polarisation.  Policy agendas have been driven by interest 
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groups seeking political and market influence, he argues.  The trade conflict amplified domestic 
controversies over agbiotech.  Civil society groups have used the trade conflict to press for higher 
regulatory standards, though more successfully in the EU than in the USA.  Thus a trade 
liberalisation agenda stimulated a ‘trading up’ process, as theorised more generally by David Vogel 
(1995).   
 
Perhaps unlike Vogel, and certainly unlike Toke, however, Bernauer diagnoses EU regulatory 
changes as a policy problem: Ever more complex, stringent, costly regulations are insufficiently 
backed by robust institutional structures for implementing them; overall the trade conflict may reduce 
investment in agri-biotechnology.  As a remedy, more centralised forms of governance in food safety 
would increase consumer confidence, he argues (Bernauer, 2003).  Yet all those changes and 
difficulties are inseparable elements of the overall story in this chapter: more stringent regulations 
remain crucial for accommodating the consumer rights frame, integrating its representatives within 
new structures, and thus potentially legitimising a centralised procedure. 
 
Economic-scientific versus social rationalities? 
 
As a general framework for analysing regulatory-trade conflicts, Grant Isaac argues that all 
regulations have two main functions. Their economic function is to improve the efficiency of the 
market system, while their social function is to ensure that market activity takes place in a way 
consistent with the preferences and expectations within a jurisdiction.  These functions frame policy 
issues in different ways: 
[The] economic perspective generally assumes that technology and innovation are vital factors of economic 
growth and welfare. As a result, it supports a regulatory framework that encourages technological progress. 
For instance, it is quite common for economic analysis to support ‘scientific-rationality’ approaches to 
regulating the risk of new technology… The economic- and scientific-rationality perspectives are similar, in 
that they decompose complex behaviour and actions into causal-consequence models, which are then used 
to forecast outcomes (Isaac, 2002: 16-17). 
[The] ‘social-rationality’ approach holds that it is insufficient to view new technology and innovations 
simply as a positive force in economic growth. Instead, the social implications of science must be 
considered and, under this consideration, new technology may not always be greeted without reservation – 
despite its potential to improve economic growth (ibid: 21). 
 
To develop a stable regulatory framework, a jurisdiction must find some way to ‘balance’ scientific 
and social rationality. In his view, ‘the ideal regulatory framework essentially builds social credence 
into the scientific-rationality paradigm’.  In particular, such a framework would acknowledge that 
normative issues are prior to empirical ones, so that science can help risk regulation to address 
societal concerns, argues Isaac (ibid: 257).  While acknowledging normative issues, he diagnoses an 
imbalance or separation between social and scientific-economic rationality, thus implying that they 
could remain separate.   
 
On the contrary, the EU story here illustrates how such rationalities were always linked, in changing 
ways.  As an explicit means ‘to restore public and market confidence’, EU reforms changed the 
previous relation between social, scientific and economic criteria.  ‘Science-based regulation’ now 
depended upon different social norms than before, e.g. as regards the wider potential effects and 
uncertainties to be evaluated.  Efficient ‘free markets’ now depended upon a clearer product-identity 
through GM labelling rules, lest ambiguity undermine food markets.  These changes can build social 
credence into scientific rationality, while expressing public preferences through social rationality (cf. 
Isaac, 2002).   
 
In this case, however, any such rationality remains within the limits of a product safety framework.  
EU advisory expertise was restructured as a means to strengthen safety claims, to enhance the 
Commission’s political authority, to promote regulatory harmonisation and to keep any precautionary 
measures compatible with EU treaty obligations. When more transparent uncertainties and stringent 
criteria are cited to justify approvals of GM products, such decisions can accommodate the 
‘consumer rights’ frame − separated from the wider issues of the anti-agbiotech frame and demands 
for alternative agricultures.  In this way, recent institutional reforms may help politicians to justify 
EU regulatory approval decisions which avoid trade barriers, thus facilitating trade liberalisation.  
 
12 
However, legitimacy problems continue as the EU relegates societal decisions to product safety and 
markets.  According to Commission policy, risk regulation ‘is the expression of societal choices’: 
rules should ensure that market mechanisms function effectively, so that safe products are available 
to accommodate consumer preferences (CEC, 2002: 14).  The EU policy problem can be diagnosed 
as a pervasive tension between the three contending agendas – especially between trade liberalisation 
versus democratic sovereignty over societal futures, beyond simply regulatory criteria for safe 
products.   
 
What European integration? 
 
What does this mean for the shape and legitimacy of European integration?  Sheila Jasanoff analyses 
biotech in such terms.  As biotech innovation devised novel ‘designs on nature’, its governance 
challenged some founding assumptions of liberal democracy, e.g. ‘that citizens have the capacity to 
participate meaningfully in decisions that seem increasingly to call for specialized knowledge and 
expertise’.  Through various expert bodies, democratic control over biotech ‘was sometimes set aside 
in favor of other culturally sanctioned notions about what makes the exercise of power legitimate’ 
(Jasanoff, 2005: 272, 287).  Within the EU agenda of regulatory harmonisation, agbiotech regulation 
undergoes a tension between two political models: seeking to eliminate national divergences in 
policy framings, versus protecting deep-seated national values that generate them (ibid: 71).   
 
The EU story in this chapter suggests more complex, contradictory futures.  Whenever one member 
state proposes more stringent criteria or broader framings for risk assessment, such proposals have 
often gained support from others, as a potential European standard (Levidow et al., 2005).  Possible 
futures go beyond simply maintaining national differences within the EU or else harmonising them 
away.  Consequently, regulatory harmonisation remains a dynamic process of disputing, broadening 
and levelling up standards.  In its own way, EU agbiotech regulation shapes the future European 
Union and its basis for democratic legitimacy.   
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Notes 
 
1. This essay draws upon results of three research projects in which the author took part: 
• 'Safety Regulation of Transgenic Crops: Completing the Internal Market?', funded by the 
European Commission, DG XII/E5, Ethical, Legal and Socio-Economic Aspects (ELSA), 
Biotechnology horizontal programme, during 1997-1999.  Reports available at 
http://technology.open.ac.uk/cts/srtc/index.html 
• 'Precautionary Expertise for GM Crops (PEG)', funded by the European Commission, DG-
Research, Quality of Life programme, during 2002-04.  Reports available at 
http://technology.open.ac.uk/cts/peg/index.html 
• ‘Trading Up Environmental Standards? Transatlantic Governance of GM Crops’, funded by 
the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council between 2002-04.  Brochure available at 
http://technology.open.ac.uk/cts/bpg/index.html; also book (Murphy and Levidow, 2006). 
 
Table 1:  Policy Changes in EU Agbiotech Regulation 
 agbiotech risk legislation  GM food regulation 
 
GM labelling &  
consumer choice 
scientific uncertainty:  
policy role 
EU advisory expertise: 
general arrangements 
EU expert advice  
on GM products 
mid-90s DRD bases the internal market on 
high level of envtl & health 
protection; harmonise criteria  
substantial equivalence 
can justify GM food safety 
no GM labelling should 
be required for safe 
products 
safety based on ‘sound 
science’;  
no evidence of risk 
(uncertainty ignored) 
hosted by the Directorate-
General responsible for 
legislation and product 
approvals 
[no EU-level expert advice on 
GM products] 
post-BSE  
crisis 
(1996-97) 
proposals to streamline DRD 
procedures and to lighten 
regulatory burdens  
NFR bases the simplified 
procedure on substantial 
equivalence  
GM food must be 
labelled according to 
scientific criteria of 
detectability  
debate over how expert 
procedures should address 
uncertainty about risks 
establish advice independent 
of policy influence, material 
interests & member states 
  
‘no evidence of risk’ from 
each GM product; 
‘adverse effects’ are defined 
narrowly 
late 1990s broaden risk asst and require 
market-stage monitoring 
(2001 revision of DRD) 
some member states 
imposed more stringent 
criteria for ‘substantial 
equivalence’ 
GM labelling rules are 
extended to  additives 
guidelines for triggering the 
Precautionary Principle, i.e. 
measures to manage uncertain 
risks  
functionally separate risk asst 
from risk mgt, thus protecting 
the scientific integrity of 
expert advice 
no reason to indicate that 
(each) GM product will cause 
adverse effects  
Since 
2001 
centralise expert advice to 
facilitate harmonisation 
(GM F&F Regn) 
abandon the simplified 
procedure for GM food 
(GM F&F Regn) 
 
label food according to 
any GM source and 
ensure traceability  
(T&L Regn) 
any restriction must be 
justified by a risk assessment 
indicating uncertain risks 
EFSA to clarify different 
views of expert bodies, and to 
build expert networks (2002 
food law) 
safety claims undergo 
pressures to acknowledge 
uncertainties and normative 
judgements  
Explicit 
policy 
aims  
exploit the potential of 
biotechnology while taking 
account of the precautionary 
principle and social concerns 
substantial equivalence 
remains a ‘dynamic 
concept’ for assessing GM 
food safety 
free choice to buy GM 
or non-GM food;  
ensure that the free 
market can function 
PP must be used in ways 
compatible with EU treaty 
obligations 
independent, objective advice 
should inform decisions which 
can gain public confidence 
obtain adequate data to 
clarify uncertainties and 
overcome expert 
disagreements in risk asst 
 
Abbreviations 
DRD = Deliberate Release Directive (EEC, 1990; EC, 2001) 
EFSA = European Food Safety Authority (EC, 2002) 
GM F&F = GM Food & Feed Regulation (EC, 2003a) 
NFR = Novel Food Regulation (EC, 1997a) 
PP = Precautionary Principle (e.g. CEC, 2000) 
T&L = Traceability and Labelling Regulation (EC, 2003b) 
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